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ABSTRACT:The objective of the study was to determine the reasons
for the strong growth during 1968-i%9 and subsequent decline in the
use of financial incentives ('equity kickers")inprivate placements.
Analysis was based in part on a special tabulation of private placement fi-
nancings, a sample survey of firms that issued such placements during
1968-1969, and 40 interviews with senior officers of financial institutions.
¶All of the evidence indicates that the sharp increase in the use of
equity kickers during 1968-1969 reflected both a general shift by institu-
tions toward equities of all sorts and a shift in bargaining power toward
the lenders. A strong, systematic relationship was observed between the
riskiness of the debt issue and the inclusion of an equity kicker, as finan-
daIly weak companies carefully designed their securities issues to meet
the preferences of private placement lenders during this period of tight
money conditions. ¶ The sharp decline in the use of kickers since 1969
reflects dampened investor interest in common stocks, especially those of
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smaller or lower-quahtycompanies, and the diSappointr1gl)e1tOinance
of the kickers issued during1968-1969.
The period 1968-1969saw a sharp rise in the use of warrants andconversion privileges in the private placementmarket, both in absolute dollarterms arid relative to total privatelyplaced debt issues (see Chart 1).At their peak
popularity in 1969, equityincentives (kickers")were included in approx-
imately 35 percent of the debtissues that were placed directly withinvestors. This contrasts witha range of O-lOpercent during 1955-1967.By year-end 1972, howeveruse of Incentives had declined toa level only modestly above
the average for the entireperiod 1955-1967, and itremained at a low level
during 1973 and 1974.
In this study we trace thereasons for the growth and subsequentdecline of equity kickers in private placements,examine the distinctive characteristicsof the issues and issuers thatincluded a kicker during the1968-1969 surge in popularity, and assess theprofitability of the kickersto the lenders. Analysis is based in parton a special tabulation of privateplacement financings during 1955-1972 a samplesurvey of 121 firms, and fortyinterviews with senior of- ficers of three bankpension funds, twelve large lifeinsurance companies, and seven investment banking firms.
CHART 1Dollar Amounts of DebtIssues That IncludedIncentive






















195565753 '59'60 '61 '62'63'6465 '66 '67'68 '69707! '72
























The strong performance of stocks after World War II arid the adoption of the
concept of total return (dividend income plus captal appreciation) spurred
each of the major types of financial institution to place an increasingly greater
share of its net new investments in corporate stocks. The quickening pace of
inflation was also widely used during 1965-1968 as a major justification for in-
creased investment of institutional funds in common stocks. It was argued that
stock investments should be increased still further because inflationary pres-
sures were inexorably building and the further inflation would enhance equity
values (Lintner 1973, pp. 2326).2 This reasoning underlay the inclusion of in-
come participations on mortgage loans on income-producing properties3 and
contributed importantly to the rise in convertible bond issues sold in the public
debt markets. Inflation was seen as the major risk; and equities of all sorts, as
the answer.
During the 1960s, the opportunity to attach equity kickers to the privately
placed debt of smaller companies seemed particularly attractive because of
their strong sales earnings and investment performance:
.a brief review of the experience of the Fortune 500 indicates that the smaller
companies are growing the fastest. (The Fortune 500 are the 500 largest manufac-
turing firms, comprising 63.7 percent of all manufacturing sales in 1969. Statistics for
the 'Second 500' largest firms, first compiled by Fortune for 1969, revealed that this
group accounted for 6.5 percent of sales.) The 50 largest manufacturing firms in the
Fortune 500 have sustained a slower growth rate since the beginning of the ece-
nornic expansion in 1961, through periods of both rapid and slower growth. In
1969, sales by the 50 largest firms rose 6.5 percent over the previous year. while the
sales growth of the entire 500 was 9.7 percent. Sales growth for the "Second 500"
firms was 11.7 percent..
Much the same pattern appears in earnings per share, a critical determinant of
stock prices in the long run. For the entire decade 1960-1969, the 50 largest firms
achieved an average growth rate in earnings per share of 5.94 percent; for the entire
1955-19601961-1965196619671968 1969
Noninsurarice pension funds 42% 52% 51%70%74%85%
State and local govenment 3 9 12 16 27 35
Life insurance companies 2 7 3 12 14 19
Other insurance companies 16 13 18 17 25 33
Mutual savings banks 2 3 8
FinancingflPrivate P1aement Market
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[I] OVERVIEW OF THE RISE AND DECUNE IN USE OF EQUITYKICKERS
Institutional Interest in Common Stocks
The sharp increase in the use of equity kickers during 1 968 and 1 969was part
of a general shift by institutions toward equities of all soits. The figuresbelow
show the net acquisition of corporate shares as a percent of thenet acquisition
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500 the growth rate sas 7.01percent; for the Second 500'it was 7.50 percent;
and for the 50 smallest firms of the'Second 500" ii was 10.21 percent. in short,tile
highest growth in sales, earnings,and opportunities for equity investmenthas
generally been outside the largestcompanies (Goldsmith, ed. 1973,p. 252).
The higher growth in sales andearnings was, in fact, reflected in the relative
performance of stock prices. Over-the-counterstocks, on average, far outper-
formed the stocks of larger,well-established companies. An index of 35over-
the-counter industrial stocksrose 8Opercent in value during 1967-1 968,ver-
sus only 34 percent for Standard & Poor'sindex of 425 industrial stocks. Inter-
estingly, their performance tendedto be superior in both rising and falling
markets during 1963-1 969.6
Tight Money Conditions:1968-1969
The ability of private placementlenders to secure incentive financingduring
1968-1969 was facilitated bya shift in bargaining power toward the lender.Fi-
nancing demands from mostsectors of the economy were strong. Netfunds raised by nonfinancialcorporations increased froman annual average of
$13 billion during 1960-1 964to $30 billion in 1968 and $38 billionin 1969.
Net bond sales bycorporations rose from anaverage of $4 billion during
1960-1964 to $1 3 billion and $12billion in 1968 and 1969,respectively (Board
of Governors 1973).
The heavy financing demandscoincided with a tightening ofmoney condi-
tions in late 1967 thatcontinued through 1 970. The netreserve position of the
commercial banking system turnednegative in 1968, reaching its tightestposi- tion in mid-i 969. At almostexactly the same time, the levelof investable funds flowing to traditionalprivate placement lenders failedto increase. The failure resulted from bothan increase in policy loans by lifeinsurance companies and an unwillingness of these lendersto increase their level ofinvestable funds by borrowing. It was reflectedin a decrease in theirnet acquisition of financial assets in 1969 (see Table 1).
Some corporate borrowerswho were able to offerstandard contractsun- doubtedly shifted fromthe private placementmarket to the public marketas differences developedbetween the two marketsin borrowing costsor in the conditions on which the fundscould be obtained.7However, smaller, less fi- nancially securecompanies were either unableto do so at all orwere unable to do so on acceptableterms or at acceptablecost, and suddenly found theirtwo primary sources offinancing_the bankingsystem and the private placement marketfar from assured.Bargaining power had shiftedstrongly toward the lender at a time whenlenders were interestedin achieving superiorinvestment performance by increasingtheir equity holdings.8
Attractiveness of EquityKickers to Borrowers
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rowers to secure an incentive feature. Sixty-one firms that issued
equity iflCCfl tives during 1 968-1 96 were surveyed for this study. '\lmostall agreedwith the statement that:
At the time of the financing we felt that the amounts ofearnings per sharedilu- tion resulting from the kicker would not he too excessive.
In part, this attitude reflected the high price-earningsratios of the issuersand the fact that the conversion and warrant exerciseprices Weretypically setat roughly a 15 percent premium over the marketprice. The stocks ofthe sixty- one firms traded at an average price-earnings ratio of 27in the year inwhich the financing was negotiated.10
The near lack of concernover the potent:al dilution reflected
managements belief thatif things work out well, we'll be happyand so will the lender
since the kicker will yield a nice return. If thingsdon't go so well,we will havesuc- ceeded in raising money ata relatively low interest ratewithout sufferingany dilution from the worthless kickerwe give the lender."
Conditions during 1970-1972
The use of equity kickers declinedsharply in 1970as investor interest incom- mon stocksespecially thosethat were not issuedby high-qualit)
companies_was dampened by therecession, the bankruptcy filingby Penn Central Transportation Company,and the sharp decline(20-30 percent) inthe stock market during thetwelve months endedJune 1970. Thegospel that stocks were a sound hedgeagainst inflationwas so far stood on its headthat there developeda very high inverse correlation
between changes instock prices and the mostrecent news on how thecurrent battle against inflation was going (tintner 1973)11Interest in investing inlow-rated companies de- clined sharply. Theresponse of investors to boththe new perceptionsof risk and theopportunity to invest inhigh-quality companiesat historically high yields was toemphasize liquidity andcreditworthinessItis not surprising, therefore, that equityincentives were includedin only 19 percent oftotal debt financingsnegotiated in the privatePlacement market during1970down from a high of38 percent duringthe first half of1969 (see Chart 2, below). Use of equitykickers continuedto decline in 1971and 1972, accounting for less thanlOpercent of totalprivately placed debtduring that period. The de- cline reflectedcontinued fear thatinflation was bad forcommon stocks as well as a substantialeasing of conditionsin the privateplacement market. In 1971-1972, in sharpcontrast with the1968-1969 period, thetraditional len- ders in theprivate placementmarket had substantialfunds to lend and found it difficult tonegotiate the inclusionof an equityincentive with companies that met their tightened























Regression1 Analysis ofthe Rise and Decline of Equity Kickers
The relationship of equity incentive use to institutional interest in common
stocks and to the tightness of money during 1 951 972 was tested statistical-
ly. Theform of the model was as follows:
$ ',
(1) a + b1 (C5/LILf) + 53 LILfILILFlagged) + b3 (NRP) -F u
SW = dollar amount of privately negotiated debt commitments that in-
h cluded equity incentives
$PP = total dollar amount of privately negotiated debt commitments dur-
'S ing each six-month period
e CS/L!LF= institutional interest in common stocks: dollar amount of net ac-
quisition of common stocks by the life insurance industry divided
by loanable funds of the industry during the six-month period12
LILFIL!LF (-2) = tightness of funds in the private placement market: loanahie funds
of the life insurance industry during the six-month period divided
by average loanabk funds of the industry over the past two years13
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NRP/Loa= tightness of conditions in the conimercial banking system: netre-
serve position of the commercial banking system at the end of the
six-irionth period divided by total loans of the system at the endof
the six-month period14
urandom error term
As shown in Table 2, the model explained69 peicent of the variance; each
variable entered with thecorrect sign and was significant at the 5percent
level. The error termswere not highly correlated, as evidenced by a Durbin-
Watson statistic of 1.89. The results confirmthe hypothesis that theuse of
equity incentives during 1955-1 972was positively correlated with Institutional
interest in common stocksas measured by the percent of loanable funds in-
vested by the life insurance industryin common stocks, and was negatively
correlated with easymoney conditions as measured by the net reserveposi-
tion of commercial banks and thetrend in loanable funds of the lifeinsurance industry.'5
Chart 2 shows both the actualpercent of privately placed debt that in-
cluded an incentive featureand the percent predictedon the basis of the
regression model, for each of the semiannualperiods 1955-1972. The modelis
consistent with the longer-termmovements although, with only two major
changes in direction in thetime series, the number of observationsin the series








NOTEThe figue.s in parentheses
are standard errors; the figures in brackets
the prohahilit' that the sign of the fdtngs coefficient is incorrect. R2is the coefficient of multipledeterminatino. DWthe Durh,n.V',tton
the;e s
SWis the dollar volume of
Issum that contained warrants- $CVthe dollar volume of (onverti- ble issues. The other symbolsin the table are defined in theaccompanying test
statistic
TABLE 2Determinants of Equity IncentiveUse
Dep.
R2 Var. Constant CSIL1LF NRP/Loans L!LFILILF(-2) {Dw}
5fF .2804 .6900 -.0049 -.2540
$PP (.0561) (.0909) (.0024) (.0552) 0.69 1.0011 1.0011 1.022] 1.0011 i.8g}
SW .0939 .3323 -.0017 -.0853 $PP (.0295) (.0477) (.0012) (.0290) 0.64 1.0021 1.001] 1.0861 1.003] 2.26)
$CV .1728 .3061 -.0030 - 1 571 $PP (.0341) (.0552) (.0014) (.0335) 0.59 1.001] 1.001] 1.022] [001] 1.67I
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The Relationship between the Riskiness of the Debt Issue
and the Inclusion of an Incentive Feature
During tight money periods, small, financially weak companies with limited fi-
h nancing alternatives must carefully design their securities issues to meet the
nt preferences of private placement lenders, It is not surprising, in view of lender
interest in equity kickers during 1968-1969, to find a strong, systematic rela-
of between the riskiness of the debt issue and tionship inclusion of an equity the
a! kicker. This is observed in the tabulation below, which shows the proportions
in- of low- and high-risk linancings within each security type and is basedon the
mail of121 firms that survey placed debt privately during results a
Si-
1968-1 969, row-risk financings included all those in which the borrower he-
of
lieved that the debt was rated the equivalent of BBB or higher; the numbers of






The mean difference between straight debt and convertibles for low-risk Ii-
nancings (first column minus second column) is 39.4 percent. The standard er-
ror of the difference is 10.5 percent, and the Z value is 3.752; in a two-tailed
test, the difference is significant at the 1 percent level. For straight debt less
debt with warrants, the difference is 45.0 percent, the standard error is 10.3,
the Z value is 4.368, and the difference is again significant at the 1 percent
level.
Of the straight debt financings, 72 percent were categorized by the bor-
rowers as low risk, in contrast to only 32 percent for convertibles and 27 per-
cent for debt with warrants. Alternatively stated, 65 percent of borrowers with
low-risk securities issued straight debt, but only 23 percent of borrowers with
high-risk securities did so.
The above results were based on assessments by borrowers of the quality
ratings of their securities. It was decided, therefore, to determine whether
there were systematic differences between straight debt and equity incentive
financings as measured by security risk. The measures we used included the
Straight Convertible Debt with Total Number
Debt Debt Warrants in Risk Class
Low-risk
financings 71.7%(33) 32.3°!,10) 26.7% (8) (51)
High-risk
linanrings 28,3 (13) 67.7 (21) 73.3 (22) (56)











borrower's ratio of total debt to totalassets. the number of times thebor- rower's mterest expense was covered byearnings before interest andtaxes total asset size of the borrower,age of the borrowing company, and
position of the debt instrument vis-"a-vis otherdebt obligations of theborrower The first
two are rough measures of theamount ot financial risk involved;total asset
size was hypothesized to relateto the degree of product-market
diversification and, therefore, the degree ofbusiness risk. Our measure ofborrower agere- flects our assumption that itis riskier to invest inyoung companies thanin older, well-establishedones. Companies originally founded before1940 were assigned a value of 1 in computing theaverages; 1941-19492; 1950-1 959 = 3; and 1960-1 969 = 4.
The tests confirmed that debtissues with incentive featureswere, o aver- age, riskier than straight interest issuespartly because of the designof the specific security. Only 3percent of the latter were Subordinated,while there- spective proportions forconvertible debt issues and debtissues withwarrants were 67 percent and 22 percent.17A significant differenceat the 1percent level was found betweenthe straight debtproportion and each of theequity incentive proportions.
qro Debt issues that includedequity incentives also tendedto be riskier than - straight debt issuesas a result of the underlying financial
condition of the issuer (see Table 3). Companiesthat included incentiveswere significantlyyounger Hig than straight debtcompanies and had significantlyhigher debt levels inrelation to total assets. Companiesthat issued convertibleswere also significantly smaller in totalasset size. Surprisingly,no significant differenceswere found in
the the means for interestcoverage
rcen
rab?e
ment Importance of Borrower'sGrowth Prospects
ScoLd
Use of equityincentives reflecteda strong institutionalinterest incommon
ender
stocks and in thepossibility of capitalgains. In view of this,a systematic rela-
Staten
tionship might beexpected to exist betweenthe borrower'sgrowth prospects and the lender'sinterest on anequity incentive. Thereis some evidence that the use ofincentive featureswas positively correlatedwith the growthpros-
A pects of thecompany. It was foundthat 59percent of the 95 high-growth
nats \ companies in our sampleincluded eitherwarrants or a conversji)nprivilege in
debt cc their debt financing.This compareswith only 41percent for the 12 low-
tfn ce. growth companies.
holidac
However,important questionsremained unansweredSpecifically, were
to the i
theresystematic differencesbetween thehigh-growthcompanies that issued
th0on
straight debt and thosethat includedan equity incentive?The substance of the preliminaryinterviewssuggested thatcompanies with goodgrowth pros-
tant ands
pects would includean incentive featureon high-risk debt issues;it was also
py for
t
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suggested that companies with good growthprospects would includean in- centive on low-risk debt issues only if the borrowerdesiredit n return forone
or moreof the following concessions:
To secure a lower fixed rate for 'cosmetic" or other
reasons (Brigham 1 966
and Hayes and Reiling 1969);
To reduce the total cost of financing (including the value ofthe incentive
feature) to below what would be possible Ofla straight interest basis (Lar-
5011 1971);
To secure relatively easier restrictive covenants andrepayment provisions.
This may he especially important in the case ofconvertible securities
(Shapiro and Wolf 1972, p.5);
To raise common equity on a delayed basis at an effectiveprice above the
present market price.
The impact of growth on the type of security issuedcan only he identified,
therefore, by considering low-risk and high-risk financing separately.In Table 4
the borrowers are divided into four categories according to theirrisk and
growth characteristics.'8
High-Risk Financings by Forty High-Growth Companies
An incentive feature was included in 77 percent of the high-risk financings
negotiated by companies with high-growth prospects (Table 4)19As expected,
the most important reasons cited by the forty borrowers for the inclusionof an
incentive feature related to their perceptions of the lenders' demands(see
Table 5). Most of the forty borroweis were very interested in theprivate place-
ment of a long-term debt issu&° and were either uncertain that the lender
would provide the financing ona fixed interest basis or believed that the
lender would not do so. Twenty-six of the forty borrowersagreed with the
statement that:
The availability of the financing was suchan important consideration that we
were not that deeply concerned over the giving of a kicker.
A number of the forty borrowerswere also attracted to the easier cove-
nants. No significant difference was observed in the maturities of the straight
debt issues and those that includedequity kickers; each group averaged fif-
teen years. However, convertible issues had significantly longer sinking fund
holidays (an average of tenyears versus four years for all others) and, according
to the loan officers interviewed,? I considerably less stringentcovenants than
those on issues of straight debtand debt with warrants. For 26 Fercent of the
high-risk, high-growth borrowers the nonprice concessionswere very impor-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6// TAB[.E 4Financing Pattern for 107 Mail-SampleBorrowersa
dA f!rm wasplacedin the high-g'owth category 'its
nianagementerspected its stockprietoappre(-,ate by mo than 6 percent per pear tor thelive years following thepreate Placement negotiations
as reported ins the mad questionnaire responses, and it was pia(edin the high.risk category if its
managenneint indicated that thdebt security wa5 rated BR or lower.
Thirty-one (78 percent)of the high-risk,high-growth borrowersthat issued debt with an incentivefeature believed thatthe total cost (fixedrate plus the cost of the feature)was less than the interestrate that would havebeen re- quired on a straight debtdeal. A few of thoseborrowers sawuncertain or bad times ahead for theircompanies and stocks and,therefore, assignedzero cost to the incentiveHowever, research byLarson (1971)suggests an alternative explanation basedon the failure of borrowersto understand thenature of the financing negotiated.More specifically,Larson suggests thatmany borrowers mistakenly believed thatthey hadnegotiated the certain saleof equity ata premium over thecurrent market price. Theyfailed torecognize that whena company issues long-termoptions for itscommon stock at a fixedprice, it is giving up thefreedom to issuethose shares ingood markets at betterprices. The exerciseprice of thewarrant does notassure the minimumproceeds possi- ble but, rather,the onlyproceeds possible. Theminimum of no fundsat all oc- curs if the price of the
common happens to beless than or equalto the exer- cise price atexpiration Thecompany could easily planto sell common at the time thewarrants expire, and,therefore, theoptions offer no advantage,but several possibledisadvantages.nHowever, apart fromthe merits of their reasoning, a number ofborrowers believedthat the inclusionof an incentive feature resultedin a totalcost that was lowerthan that of theirstraight debt alternative; and for55 percent ofthe high-risk,










Debt with incentive 75.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































b292 Thomas R. Piper and laspar II.Arriolit
Finally, thirty-eight of the forty borrowers agrcecjwith the slateilleritthat:
At the time of the financing we felt that the amount ofearnings per share dilution
resulting from the kicker would not be too excessive.
As discussed earlier, this attitude retlected the highprice-earnings ratios of the
issuers and the realization that 'if things work out well, we'll hehappy andso will the lender, If things don'tgo so well, we will have succeeded in
raising
money at a relatively low interest rate without sufferingany dilution from the
worthless kicker we gave the lender."
Low-Risk Financing by High-Growth Companies
The mail-sample data provided additionalevidence that low-riskfinancings by
high-growth companies includedan equity incentive only at theborrower's
option. First the proportion of all uinancingsthat included an equityincentive was lower for low-risk, high-growthcompanies than for high-risk,high-growth
companies (37 percent versus 77 percent).Furthermore, the rankingsof the
reasons for including an incentive featurewere different for the twocategories. The former ranked 'to raiseequity capital" second in importance,which is con- sistent with the hypothesis thatinclusion of an incentive wouldbenefit the borrower. The latter rankedit sixth (see Table 6). The formeralso saw the inclu-
sion of an incentive feature"to conipensate the lender forrisk" as far less im-
portant than did the latter.
There was alsosome interest in window dressingamong a//issuers of debt with incentive featuresaninterest that was confirmed byfield interviews with institutional lendersand investment bankers,Seven of the 61 issuers
(11 percent) indicated thatwindow dressingwas a very importantreason for including an incentive,especially during the periodwhen interest rateswere moving up to record high levels.The financial officercould report to topman- agement and to outsiders that thecompany not only had secureda relatively attractive coupon but had alsosold shares at a price thatwas typically above the current market.While the reported "sale"of shares can bechallenged for reasons outlined earlier, itapparently was convincingto some managements. It is noteworthy thatthe sixteen low-riskhigh-growth companies whichin- cluded an incentivefeature (37percent of the total sample inthis category) re- ported that themost important reason fordoing so was to facilitateplacement of the debt. Thisdoes not necessarilyconflict with the beliefthat such bor- rowers could have negotiated


















(entl,e1Lender wanted equity incen-
tive feature tocompensate for
borrower's risk
2.To make sale ofsecurities
easier since incentivefeature
popular
S 3.To secure lower total cost"
To induce lenders tomake loan
during tight money conditions
To get easier covenants
ToraiseequitycaPital
e
7.Lender used incentive feature
toavoid violating usury laws
SOURCEMail sample.
it
average rating is the sum of the weights very important =1; fairly important2 slightly important or
unimportant3) assigned to a specific reason by each respondent, divided by the total number of respondents.
S The lower the rating, the more important the reason.
S
e Debt FinancingS by Companies with Low-Growth Prospects
- Only 12 of the 107 borrowers in the mail samplecharacterized their corn-
ly panies as having low growth prospects. Although this mayreflect the ability of
many low-growth firms to finance themselvesinternally, it may, instead, lend
r support to the hypothesis that companies with high-risksecurities and low
growth prospects had difficulty in placing their debt privately on any basis.The
latter hypothesis is supported by the results of interviews with several invest-
e- ment bankers who stated that BB- and B-rated borrowerswith low-growing,
nt unexciting stocks and without an existing relationship with a lenderhad sub-
r- stantial difficulty in placing their debt privately during 1966-1969. Further sup-
port for this hypothesis was provided by interviews with threelife insurance
rs, companies about loans made to nine high-risk, high-growth companiesduring
this period. The lenders stated that in seven of the nine cases, the loan request
er would have been denied if the company's outlook had been for little or no
an growth. They stated that the low-growth prospects would have made the in-
centive feature uninteresting and that, as a matter of the basic prevailing
TABLE 6










5 2.5 1 1.9
1 1.8 2 2.0
3 2.3 3 2.3
4 2.3 4 2.3
6 2.9 5 2.3
2 2.2 6 2.4





In these estimates,it is of courseassumed that the straightdebt financings in the mail sampleand the debt financingsthat includedan incentive feature were alike except for thefeature. To theextent that the latter alsotended to be lower in qualitythan straightinterest financings, theconcessions are under- stated.
Institutional lenders havebeen disappointedby the performanceof the equity incentivesnegotiated during1967-1970 Onlyone of the fifteen bank pension departmentsand life insurance
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philosophy (luring 1966-1 969, they would only invest ina high-risk securityii
they wuld receive an incentive feature with a potentially bigpayoff
The structure of the financings by the eight low-risk, low-growthcompanies
was consistent with the belief that lenders would not be interestedin negotiat
ing equity kickers with low-growth companies hut would beWilling to lendto
them on a straight interest basis because of their low risk.Six of theeight fi-
nancings were done that way; the two companies that included
equity incen-
tives did so in the belief that a straight interest issue wouldhave resultedin a higher total cost.
[Ill]PERFORMANCE OF EQUITY INCENTIVES
The field interviews and mail-sample dataclearly indicate thatlenders werere- quired to grant some concessionon the fixed rate in return for the
incentive feature. Inclusion of warrants loweredthe rate, onaverage, by roughly 20-30
basis points from the levelnecessary on a straight interest basis.
As indicated in the following tabulation,a conversion feature lowered the fixedrate, on aver- age, by roughly 100-1 25 basis points(the data shownare from the mailsam- ple; the numbers of issuesare shown in parentheses) :24
Straight Debt with
Convedjble Debt Warrants DebtSeveral reasons were cited by the institutional lenders and the investment
bankers for the poorprofitability of equit' incentves. First, there was a strong
belief that qualitystandaids had been compromised during 1967-1970, in part
on thestrength of forecastswhich proved to he overly optimistic_-of en-
ticingly high earnings pershare. Second, the general decline in price-earnings
ratios had oftenoffset substantial earnings gains. Third, some difficulties had
been encounteredin both the timing and execution of the conversion or exer-
cise of thewarrant.2 More specifically, several lenders had experienced diffi-
culties in gaining their owncommittee's approval of the kicker, securing an ef-
fective registration statementfor sale of the stock received upon conversion
(or exercise), andselling large blocks of stock in small companies. The process
often required four toeight months, by which time market conditions had fre-
quently turned unfavorable.26
Analysis of the 65 incentive issuesnegotiated during 1968-1969 and in-
cluded in the mail sample supportsthe field interview evidence. Only 17 of the
65 kickers had beenexercised or converted as of December 1975; the tabula-
tion below shows theratio of the market price of those issues to theirexercise
or conversionprice (data are from the mail sample):
On Date On
Exercised At Year-End December 16,
or Converted 1974 1975
65 Issues with
Incentive Feature
17 exercised 173% 132%
48 not exercised Not exercised
The gains on these 17 werepossibly quite substantiaL as themarket price at
the time of exercise or conversion was, onaverage, 73 percentabove the exer-
cise (conversion) price (thecorresponding median was 32percent). Unfor-
tunately, we have no information onwhether the shares received were ac-
tually sold and, if sold, at what price.Indeed, failure to have soldpromptly
would have left the lender withsubstantial unrealized losses onthe stock re-
ceived. As of December 1975, the meanprice was only 59 percentof the origi-
nal exercise or conversion price.(Hereafter, the term "exercise"refers to con-
version as well.)
Of the 65 debt financings thatincluded equity kickers, 48had not been ex-
ercised by December 1975, and prospectsfor doing so profitablyseemed low.
The median ratio of the December 1975
market price to the exerciseprice was
only 28 percent. Of equal importanceonly four of the 48 wereselling at a
market price in excess of the exerciseprice. Of the 48,39 were selling at
market prices ess than half of theexercise price andseemingly have little
chance of profitable exercise prior toexpiration.
Mean Median MeanMedian MeanMedian
46°/o 350/0 59% 42°/o
31 32 34 28




























is low.The failure of fenders to realize profits on the great majority ot the Sixty-fjv
equity kickers resulted in part from relatively poor earnings patterns for the
firms during 1969-1974. Twenty-five of the firms experienced a dedirie in
earnings per share during this period, with 13 actually operating at a deficit in
1974. This record compares unfavorably with the earnings patterns for the 60
largest manufacturing corporations in the United States, in whose equities the
insurance companies might have invested.27 Sixteen firms showed a growth of
earnings per share of over 100 percent during the period, However, as indi-
cated in the following tabulation of changes in earnings per share during
1969-1974, that performance was about the same as for the 60 largestcor-
porations:
Decline of Increase of
51-100% 0-50% 125% 2650°I51-100°Jo>100% Total
65 issuers of
equity incentives 30% 9%22% 8% 6% 25%ioo°
60 largest cos.
(oil cos. excl.) 7 10 3 13 35 32 100
76 largest cos.
(md. oil cos.) 5 8 3 11 33 40 100
The value of equity incentive features was also hurt bya general decline in
stock prices. Various stock price indexes at year-end 1974were down 30 to
40 percent from their 1968 levels, as indicated in followingdata for year-end
stock index levels (1971 = 100):28
Strong earnings growthwas typically more than offset by a sharp decline in the
price-earnings ratio.
Examination of the price-earningsratios of the 65 companies that issued
equity kickers confirms theseverity of the problem. As reported earlier, firms
that issued equity kickerstraded at an averageprice-earnings ratio of 27 in the
year of the financing. By year-end1974, the average ratiowas 5, with no close
relationship to the earningsrecord the firms had compiled during1969-1 974
(see Table 7).
It would beunwarranted however, to concludethat because profits were
not realized on a largeproportion of equity kickers, Inders didnot have the
196819691970 1971 1972 19731974
Dow-jones industrials 110 90 94 100 116 95 69
S&P 425 industrials 100 89 90 100 117 96 67
NQBIA 84 83 72 100---
NASDAQ industrials--- 100 113 72 49
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lncentives
P/[ Ratios





per Share,1969-1974 Median Mean Median Mean
Pechne
'The cakutation could not he made bec.eoItFieiarge nunilr otoloparries that operated ala deficit in 1974.
opportunity in many cases to exercise the option at a substantial profit. The
opportunity was often there, but lenders did not take advantage of it. At some
point between issuance and year-end 1 974, a substantial average profit could
have been realized on 26 of the 48 equity kickers not exercised. Furthermore,
the peak potential was not realized on the 17 equity kickers actually exercised.
The mean peak potential for the 17, as measured by the ratio of market price
to exercise price, was 325 percent (median = 177 percent). For the market
price actually realized, the ratio was 173 percent (132 percent). At year-end
1974, the ratio was 46 percent (35 percent). On the 26 potentially profitable
equity kickers not exercised, the peak mean ratio was 200 percent (median
= 158 percent), and the year-end ratio was 44 percent (45percent). The year-
end 1974 ratio for the remaining 22 equity kickers not exercised was 16 per-
cent (17 percent). The foregoing comparison are summarized in thefollowing
tabulation; the figures are ratios of the market price to the exercise price:
51-100% 27 31
050o4 15 16 5 6
Increase
O-25% 19 21 4 4
26-50% 23 48 6 6
51-100°/a 15 16 5 6










17Actually exercised 325%177% 1 73% 1 32°/o 46% 35%
26Potential gain
between issue date
and year-end 1974200°/a 1 58% Not exercised 44% 45%
22No potential gain
between issue dateNo potential
and year-end 1974 gain Not exercised 16% 17%e
[IV] OUTLOOK FOR THE USEOF INCENTIVE FINANCING
Very few debt financingsplaced privately in 1973 and 1 974 included equity
incentives. Interviews withfifteen institutional lenders and three investment
bankers, as well as the results of ananalysis of all privately placed debt issues
reported by the Institutional Investormagazine in its annual corporate financ-
ing summary, indicate that 2-3percent of all privately placed corporate debt
included either warrants or a conversionprivilege in 1974.
The sharp decline in use of equity incentivesresulted from several changes
in lender and borrower attitudes.The majority of the eighteen institutional len-
ders and investment bankers interviewed in1975 reported either no interest or
only a slight interest in incentive financing.29Lender interest in investingn
securities rated BB or below is very low and mostlenders are presently unwill-
ing to compromise their tightened qualitystandards in return for an incentive
The reaction of lenders to high-risk financings seems to be either to avoid them
or to try to protect themselves againstthe risk by imposing restrictions and
security arrangements. This standsinmarked contrast to attitudesin
1968-1969, when many lenders seemed willing to accept high risk if it was ac-
companied by the possibility of high return. All eighteen respondents stated
that companies with poor growth prospects and with securities rated B8 and
below would be unable to raise debt money. Companies with securities rated
BB and below but with good growth prospects would fare only slightly better.
Thirteen respondents felt that these borrowers would be unable to get debt fi-
nancing, while five indicated that these borrowers might be able to sell debt
issues that included equity incentives. The decline in use of incentive financing
(equity kickers) also resulted from the reluctance of borrowers to issue war-
rants or convertible securities at the low prices prevalent n 1974. Eleven of the
eighteen respondents stated that it is not possible to negotiate an equity kicker
on debt financings by companies rated BBB or above. Four others stated that it
was possible to secure kickers on some BBB-rated financings, but not on financ-
ings rated A and above. The remaining three respondents had no opinion.
It is hazardous to forecast tomorrow's fashions on the basis of today's tastes.
Clearly, many lenders have been hurt both by the low profitability of kickers
and by delinquencies and defaults on loans to higher-risk borrowers. They
stated in 1975 that they will not soon forget their troubles with marginal cred-
its and will not relax their tightened quality standards. Thissuggests that high-
risk borrowers will face considerable difficulty in issuing funded debt in the
foreseeable future. In contrast to the period 1968-1969, inclusion of warrants
or a conversion privilege will not entice lenders to drop their standards.
The outlook for the inclusion of equity kickerson debt issues rated BBB or
higher is less certain. Although attitudes ofboth lenders and borrowers were
largely negative in 1975,a strong stock market could change the situation
substantially. Borrowers would find theissuance of kickers less painful and len-
ders, encouraged bya few successes in stock investing, might show increased
298 Thomas R. Piper and Jasuar H. Arnoldiiinterest. Furthermore, lenders can avoid some of the risks anddifficulties of
equity kickers by changing their structure. For example, the lendermight
negotiate a participation in the income of the borroweror the right, upon exer-
cise of the kicker, to sell the stock received back to theCompany either at a
preset price-earnings ratio or at book value. However, itseems very unlikely
that the use of incentive financing will come close to approaching thelevels of
1968-1969 in the foreseeable future.
NOTES
1Special tabulations were developed for this study by examining thestructure of each of the
24,032 private placements reported for the years 1955 through 1972 in the CorporateFi-
nancing Dkeclory, published semiannually by the Invest rnent Dealers' Digest. Secondary is-
sues and financings by small business investment companies and venture capital firms were
omitted trom the series. Data for 1973 and 1974 are based on field interviews.
According to Lintner, similar arguments were made in the mid-1950s for equity investments.
Approximately 50 percent of the forward commitments on income-producing properties
made in 1968-1969 included an income participation. This compares witha level of only
6 percent during 1964-1967 (see Piper 1976>.
Convertible bonds accounted for 25 percent of total bond sales iii the public market during
1967-1969, up from 10 percent in 1964 and an average of 21 percent during 1965-1966 (see
Statistical 8ulletin, Securities and Exchange Commission).
The figures show the percent change in price during the year of the 35-stock index of shares
traded in the over-the-counter market (NQBIA), taken from Dana (various issues) and the
Standard & Poor's index oF 425 industrials (S&P425):
Shapiro and Wolf (1972, p.16> cite the increased performance consciousness of life in-
surance companies and corporate pension funds as an important factor in the increased use
ot equity incentive during the latter half of the 1960s (see also Belliveau 1969>. Every invest-
ment officer interviewed for this study stated that the investment performance philosophy
of 1968 and 1969 and the desire for capital gains encouraged the inclusion of equity incen-
tives on debt placed privately with their iflStitutiOfls.
See Shapiro and Wolf (19721 for a full discussion of the structure of the private placement
market.
The importance of tight money conditions and a strong equity market have been cited by
Williams and Williams 1960, pp.123-1341 and Hayes (1965> in explaining fluctuations in
the use of equity kickers during the late 1950s and early 1960s.
This finding is consistent with the conclusions of Williams and Williams (19601, based on
their study of incentive financing during the late 1950s. It stands in sharp contrast to the
strong pressure exerted by lenders to secure income dud equity participations on real estate
financings during 1967-1969.
The price-earnings (PIE) ratios were calculated by dividing the average of the high and low
stock price in the year of the financing by the earnings per share before extraordinary items
in the same year. The sample includes all mail-sample borrowers for which the necessary
data were available (268 borrowers) less 27 firms that reported operating lossesand
another 8 that had PIE ratios in excess of 100.
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299A smilac reassesmcnt of the profit potential of or orlir' p.tipatioflsfl real csatc- k,0
was under way at approximately the same time, andthe percent of mortgage k)ancOmnlit
ments that included income participations in 1971 and P172 tell to approximately 5-10 per-
cent (Piper 1976).
We focus on the life insurance industry bmause (if its importance in thprivate placerlient
market.
The level of loanahie funds or each six-month period was derived from seasonally adjusted
flow-of-funds data by summing the net increase in surplus and the net increase in liabilities
and subtracting the net increase in policy loans.
The net reserve position of the commercial banking system has been a reliable measure of
the degree of tightness in the capital markets (see Sinai).
Additional tests were conducted to determine whether inflationary expectations may have
had a unique impact not captured by the CS/LILF variable. The inflation variable was split,
with one part (IX!NA) representing the period 195S-1969, when investors believed that
stocks should be purchased as a hedge against inflation, and the other (EXiN) representing
1970-1972, when investors believed that inflation was bad for stocks (see tintoer 1973) A
measure of inflationary expection was created by using a second-order Pascal distributed
lag on the implicit, fixed weight price deflator for nonfarm output, provided by Robert
Cordon of the University of Chicago.
As shown below, neither inflation variable was statistically significant at the 5percent
level and the explanatory power of the model svas not improved:
$!f/SPP= .1950 ± .0169 EXINA -.0032 IXIN8 + .6314 (CS/Len
(.06301(.0104) (.0099) 1333)
(.0021 1.0571 (373] (0011




Questionnaires were sent to all 257 borrowers whowere reported to have negotiated a
debt issue with warrants or a conversion feature witha life insurance company during
1968-1969. Questionnaires were alsosent to 146 firms that negotiated straight debt deals
with life insurance companies during thesame period. Usable responses were received from
121 firms. Of the 121, 67 had negotiated debt financingsthat included equity kickers, and
the remaining 54 had borrowed ona straight debt basis. No significant differences at the
5 percent level were found betweenrespondents and nonrespondents in terms of the level
of financial risk, as measured by the numberof times that the firm earned its interest and by
the ratio of total debt to totalassets; the asset size of the borrower; theage of the firm; or
the growth in earnings per share from thedate of the financing through 1972
Senior debt was assigned to theunsubordinated category. There were 120 straight debt
issues, 114 convertible issues, and 81 issues withwarrants, for a total of 315
Only 107 of the 121 companieswere tabulated in this fashion. The remaining 14 failed to
answer one of the questionnaire questions
necessary to assign them to one of the four cells
Six of the twelve straight debtissues were by closely held companies. In interviews, lenders
indicated they were reluctantto negotiate incentive features with closelyheld companies
because there was no public marketfor the stock.
The advantages to the borrowerof selling its debt in theprivate placement market include
lower issuance costs, fasterconsummation and flexibility of negotiationover the terms and
provisions of the security, both at thetime it is issued and subsequentlyas well (Shapiro and Wolf 1972, Chap. 2).
31)0 Thomas R. Piixr and Iaspar II. Arnold21Forty i terviews were hold with seven irwestnient bankers and with senior investment of-
ficers of three bank pension funds and twelve of the largest life insurance companies.
H is possible that some of the sn-railer Companies could only have sold common at a sub-
stantial discount to market, in which case the use of warrants or a convertible might have
been attractive in economic terms.
Depth interviews were conducted with three lire insurance lenders on twenty-four private
placements negotiated during 1968-1969.
The rate concession on a convertible issue was greater than on an issue containing warrants
because the entire amount of the convertible issue could be converted into equity, whereas
the warrants provided, on average, only a 38 percent equity play (based on the ratio of the
dollar amount paid by the lender to the borrower upon exercise of the warrants and the in-
itial dollar amount of the loan). The difference In rate concession was unrelated to the level
at which the Option prices were set. The mean exercise price for the warrants and the con-
version price for the convertible debt were respectively 12 percent and 15 percent above
the market price at the tin-re of the negotiations.
Thirtecr respondents cited compromise of quality standards as an important reason for the
poor profitability of equity incentives negotiated during 1967-1970; 1 disagreed, and 2
thought the reason to be only slightly important. On the importance of overly optimistic
forecasts, 14 agreed, i disagreed, and 1 thought the reason only slightly important. The
third point was cited by 6 respondents, rejected by 6, and assigned only slight importance
by 1.
The seriousness of this problem depended, of course, on whether )a) the lender secured full
registration rights and (b) the loan agreement provided for a time period during which the
kicker could not be converted or exercisedL
As reported in Fortune arid ranked at year-end 1974 according to sales. Excluded are all oil
companies because their earnings gains were extrerriely high during 1969-1974 for reasons
considered peculiar to the industry.
NQBIA represents an index of 35 over-the-counter industrials reported in Dana (various
issues). NASDAQ is the over-the-counter index of the National Association of Securities
Dealers.
For a company whose outstanding securities were rated below BBR, 4 respondents ex-
pressed a definite interest in kickers; 3, slight interest; and 11, no interest. The correspond-
ing figures for ratings of BBB or better were 3, 9, and 6.
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